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Filed by: Trial Section Merits Panel  
Mail Stop INTERFERENCE  
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences  
United States Patent and Trademark Office  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450  
Tel: 571-272-4683 Fax: 571-273-0942

Filed: August 24, 2007

Paper No. 56

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS  
AND INTERFERENCES

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MING ZHONG DING, KIAN KEONG OOI, YANG QUAN CHEN,  
JACK MING TENG, SHUANG QUAN MIN, and BENG WEE QUAK

Junior Party  
(U.S. Patent 6,704,159)

v.

NEIL SINGER, MARK TANQUARY, and KENNETH PASCH

Senior Party  
(Application 10/267,332)

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Patent Interference No. 105,436  
(Technology Center 2600)

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Before JAMESON LEE, SALLY C. MEDLEY, and JAMES T. MOORE,  
*Administrative Patent Judges.*

LEE, *Administrative Patent Judge.*

Decision -- Motions -- Bd. Rule 125(a)

1 Party Ding has filed Motions 1 and 2. Party Singer has filed Motion 1. We  
2 have jurisdiction to decide these motions under 35 U.S.C. § 135(a).

3 A. Background Facts (Referenced as BF. ¶ No.)

4 1. This interference was declared on April 17, 2007.

5 2. Junior party Ding is involved on the basis of its Patent No. 6,704,159,  
6 based on Application 09/810,337, filed March 16, 2001.

7 3. Senior party Singer is involved on the basis of its Application  
8 10/267,332, filed October 9, 2002.

9 4. Junior party Ding's real party in interest is Seagate Technology LLC.

10 5. Senior party Singer's real party in interest is Convolve, Inc.

11 6. At the time of declaration of this interference, junior party Ding was  
12 accorded benefit of the filing date of Application 60/212,546, filed June 20, 2000.

13 7. At the time of declaration of this interference, senior party Singer was  
14 accorded benefit of the filing dates of Application 09/873,464, filed June 4, 2001;  
15 Application 09/262,781, filed March 4, 1999; Application 60/109,145, filed  
16 November 20, 1998; and Application 60/077,292, filed March 5, 1998.

17 8. The count of this interference is Ding's patent claim 14 or Singer's  
18 application claim 28.

19 9 Claim 14 of the Ding patent and claim 28 of the Singer application  
20 read identically as follows:

21 A method of operating an apparatus comprising steps of:

22  
23 (a) receiving an acoustic adjusting factor, the apparatus being  
24 adapted to receive the acoustic adjusting factor externally;

25

1 (b) modifying at least one control parameter for only an  
2 actuator of the apparatus responsive to the acoustic adjusting factor;  
3 and

4  
5 (c) controlling the actuator using the at least one modified control  
6 parameter.

7  
8 10. At the time of declaration of this interference, Ding's patent claims 1  
9 and 14 and Singer's application claims 27 and 28 were the only claims designated  
10 as corresponding to the count.

11 11. Claim 1 of Ding's patent and claim 27 of the Singer application read  
12 the same as each other.

13 12. The application from which Ding's involved patent issued led to  
14 Published Application U.S. 2002/0006010, published on January 17, 2002, of  
15 which claim 1 is identical to claim 1 of Ding's involved patent and claim 27 of  
16 Singer's involved application.

17 13. Singer's involved application was filed on October 9, 2002, and  
18 Singer's claims 27 and 28 were introduced into that application by amendment on  
19 September 21, 2004.

20 14. Oral hearing was held in this case on March 27, 2007.

21 B Analysis

22 Ding's Motion 1

23 By Motion 1, party Ding asserts that both Singer's claims corresponding to  
24 the count of this interference, claims 27 and 28, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §  
25 112, first paragraph, for lack of written description. For reasons discussed below,  
26 the motion is without merit.

27 Singer's claims 27 and 28 read as follows:

1           27. A method of operating a disc drive for improved acoustic  
2 management, comprising steps of:

3  
4           (a) receiving an acoustic/performance comprising<sup>1</sup> factor  
5 from a host;

6  
7           (b) tuning performance of a disc drive according to the  
8 compromising factor, the step of tuning including applying the  
9 compromising factor to at least one control parameter for the disc  
10 drive to generate at least one modified control parameter; and

11  
12           (c) executing a control loop for controlling an operation of  
13 the disc drive, the control loop using the at least one modified control  
14 parameter.

15  
16           28. A method of operating an apparatus comprising steps of:

17  
18           (a) receiving an acoustic adjusting factor, the apparatus being  
19 adapted to receive the acoustic adjusting factor externally;

20  
21           (b) modifying at least one control parameter for only an  
22 actuator of the apparatus responsive to the acoustic adjusting factor;  
23 and

24  
25           (c) controlling the actuator using the at least one modified  
26 control parameter.

27  
28           A moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the  
29 relief requested. 37 CFR § 41.121(b). Applying the appropriate rule for claim  
30 interpretation is a prerequisite for party Ding to prevail on its assertion that  
31 Singer's claims 27 and 28 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,  
32 for lack of written description. If party Ding has not properly determined what are

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<sup>1</sup> It appears that the parties have assumed that the claim recites "acoustic/performance compromising factor" rather than "acoustic/performance comprising factor." We will do the same. Party Singer may make an appropriate correction if it prevails and when jurisdiction over its application has returned to the Primary Examiner.

1 required by Singer's claims, then it cannot have established entitlement to the  
2 requested relief. That is the case here.

3

4 Expressly provided in 37 CFR § 41.200(b) (2005) is the following:

5 A claim shall be given its broadest reasonable construction **in**  
6 **light of the specification of the application or patent in which it**  
7 **appears.** (Emphasis added)

8

9 The predecessor rule to 37 CFR § 41.200(b), i.e., 37 CFR § 1.633(a) (1995-2004),  
10 also states the same, regarding the basis of claim interpretation:

11 In deciding an issue raised in a motion filed under this paragraph (a), a  
12 claim will be construed **in light of the specification of the**  
13 **application or patent in which it appears.** (Emphasis added)

14

15 When the predecessor rule was promulgated in 1995, there was a notice in  
16 the Federal Register making clear that under the rule it was improper to interpret a  
17 party's claim in light of another party's specification, even where the claim was  
18 copied from the other party. Specifically, it was stated, 60 Fed. Reg. 14488, 14506  
19 (March 17, 1995):

20 As proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,  
21 paragraph(a) of § 1.633 is revised in several respects. The first is to  
22 specify that a claim shall be construed in light of the specification of  
23 the application or patent in which it appears. The amendment clarifies  
24 an ambiguity in PTO interference practice. Previously, the Federal  
25 Circuit had interpreted § 1.633 to require an ambiguous claim to be  
26 interpreted in light of the patent from which it was copied. In re  
27 Spina, 975 F.2d 854, 856, 24 USPQ2d 1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
28 While this interpretation was a possible interpretation of previous §  
29 1.633, PTO had intended that a copied claim be interpreted in light of  
30 the specification of the application or patent in which it appears. The  
31 rule, as adopted, will make ex parte and inter partes practice the same.  
32 A claim that has been added to a pending application for any purpose,

1 including to provoke an interference, will be given the broadest  
2 reasonable interpretation consistent with the disclosure of the  
3 application to which it is added, as are claims which are added during  
4 ex parte prosecution.  
5

6 In Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 479 n.2, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1554 n.2 (Fed. Cir.  
7 1997), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that the U.S. Patent  
8 and Trademark Office had ample authority to promulgate such a rule and allowed  
9 to stand a plain application of the rule.

10 According to party Ding, both the term “acoustic/performance  
11 compromising factor” in Singer’s claim 27 and the term “acoustic adjusting factor”  
12 in Singer’s claim 28 are used in the specification of Ding’s patent and that in the  
13 context of Ding’s patent specification those terms should be narrowly construed  
14 such that (1) they mean the same thing despite the apparent difference in wording;  
15 and (2) they both mean a single numerical value (Motion 1, page 6, line 26 to page  
16 7, line 3). Party Ding’s position is that in light of that narrow construction of the  
17 claim terms in light of Ding’s specification, Singer’s claims are without written  
18 description in Singer’s specification.

19 Also according to party Ding, the term “control parameter” in Singer’s  
20 claims 27 and 28 is used in the specification of Ding’s patent and that in the  
21 context of Ding’s patent specification (Motion 1, page 5, ll. 4-8):

22 A control parameter is a parameter calculated independently of  
23 execution of the disk drive’s control loop, and defines how the control  
24 loop acts on inputs received into the control loop. SOF 34. Control  
25 parameters are not calculated based on or using the inputs to the  
26 control loop, and are not calculated as part of or during the execution  
27 of the control loop, but rather are preset prior to execution of the  
28 control loop. SOF 17, 35.  
29

1           It is further asserted that based on Ding’s specification, the desired seek  
2 velocity is not a control parameter (Motion 1, page 5, line 11; page 8, line 16).  
3 Party Ding’s position is that in light of the specific meaning of “control parameter”  
4 provided in Ding’s specification, Singer’s claims are without written description in  
5 Singer’s specification insofar as the modifying a control parameter limitation is  
6 concerned.

7           Despite a direct regulation to the contrary, party Ding in its Motion 1  
8 interprets Singer’s claims 27 and 28 in light of not Singer’s specification in which  
9 Singer’s claims appear, but in light of Ding’s specification. The motion does not  
10 cite to or acknowledge 37 CFR § 41.200(b), nor predecessor rule 37 CFR  
11 1.633(a). Ding does not acknowledge the existence of a contrary rule until its  
12 reply, and even then Ding offers no reason why the provision of 37 CFR §  
13 41.200(b) should be deemed invalid. Instead, Ding cites to *In re Spina*, 975 F.2d  
14 854, 858, 24 USPQ2d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the application of which was  
15 rendered ineffective by the rule change in 1995 as noted above. In any event, even  
16 if we travel back to pre-1995 and attempt to apply *In re Spina* to this interference,  
17 Ding has not shown that Singer’s claims 27 and 28 are ambiguous on their face  
18 such that we must resort to interpretation in light of the specification of the patent  
19 from which those claims were copied. Under *In re Spina*, *supra*, and even  
20 assuming that it still has application today, it is only when the terms of a copied  
21 claim are ambiguous that an interpretation would be made based on the  
22 specification of the patent from which the claim was copied. Party Ding skipped  
23 the threshold ambiguity analysis and proceeded directly to interpreting Singer’s  
24 claims in light of Ding’s specification.

25           Because party Ding interprets Singer’s claims 27 and 28 in light of Ding’s

1 specification, and not Singer’s specification, to support the assertion that Singer’s  
2 claims 27 and 28 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack  
3 of written description, the motion is without merit. It has not been shown that  
4 Singer’s claims 27 and 28, when construed in light of Singer’s own specification,  
5 would also have the narrow meanings for claim terms as party Ding would have  
6 them construed in light of Ding’s specification. For instance, in light of Singer’s  
7 own specification, “acoustic/performance compromising factor” may not mean the  
8 same as “acoustic adjusting factor” and neither may be so narrow as to mean a  
9 single numerical value.

10 Ding’s motion has failed to set forth a prima facie case of entitlement to  
11 relief. It is not necessary to consider Singer’s opposition which construes its  
12 claims in light of its own specification and attempts to show where the written  
13 description lies for its claims 27 and 28.

14 Ding’s Motion 1 is **denied**.

15 Ding’s Motion 2

16 By Motion 2, party Ding asserts that both Singer’s claims corresponding to  
17 the count of this interference, claims 27 and 28, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §  
18 135(b)(2), which provides:

19 A claim which is the same as, or for the same or substantially the  
20 same subject matter as, a claim of an application published under  
21 section 122(b) of this title may be made in an application filed after  
22 the application is published only if the claim is made before 1 year  
23 after the date on which the application is published.

24  
25 The application from which Ding’s involved patent issued was published on  
26 January 17, 2002, with claim 1, the same claim as claim 1 of Ding’s involved  
27 patent (BF. ¶ 12). Singer’s involved application was filed on October 9, 2002, and

1 Singer's claims 27 and 28 were introduced into Singer's involved application by  
2 amendment on September 21, 2004 (BF. ¶ 13).

3 According to party Ding, each of Singer's claim 27 and 28 is the same as, or  
4 substantially the same as, claim 1 of Ding's published application. Singer does not  
5 dispute that its claim 27 is the same as Ding's claim 1, but disagrees with party  
6 Ding's assertion that Singer's claim 28 is substantially the same as Ding's claim 1.

7 More importantly, however, Singer asserts that whether any of its claims 27  
8 and 28 is the same or substantially the same as Ding's claim 1 is irrelevant for  
9 purposes of 35 U.S.C.

10 § 135(b)(2), because Singer's claims 27 and 28 were not "made in an application  
11 filed after" publication of Ding's involved application, a triggering condition for  
12 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2).

13 The key question is whether Singer's involved application is an application  
14 filed after January 17, 2002, the date of publication of Ding's Published  
15 Application US 2002/0006010. If it is, then a triggering or threshold condition of  
16 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2) is met and we will need to consider the other parts of 35  
17 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2) regarding whether Singer's claims 27 and 28 are for the same  
18 or substantially the same subject matter as a claim in Ding's published application  
19 and whether Singer's claims 27 and 28 were made before one year after the date of  
20 publication of Ding's Published Application US 2002/0006010. If it is not, then  
21 the inquiry is over and we need not proceed any further because 35 U.S.C. §  
22 135(b)(2) has no application where the allegedly offending claims were not made  
23 in an application filed after publication of the earlier application with a claim  
24 drawn to the same or substantially the same subject matter.

25 The issue concerns 35 U.S.C. § 120, which in pertinent part states:

1           An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the  
2           manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in  
3           an application previously filed in the United States, or as provided by  
4           section 363 of this title, which is filed by an inventor or inventors  
5           named in the previously filed application shall have the same effect,  
6           as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior  
7           application, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or  
8           termination of proceedings on the first application or on an application  
9           similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the first  
10          application and if it contains or is amended to contain a specific  
11          reference to the earlier filed application.  
12

13          Responding to Ding's motion, Singer identified two earlier filed applications  
14          the respective filing dates of which Singer believes it is entitled under 35 U.S.C. §  
15          120, for purposes of determining the effective filing date of its involved application  
16          when applying 35 U.S.C.

17          § 135(b)(2): (1) a first application 09/262,781, filed on March 4, 1999 and issued  
18          on November 6, 2001; and (2) a subsequent application 09/873,464, filed on June  
19          4, 2001 and issued on May 6, 2003. Singer's involved application is a continuation  
20          of application 09/873,464 ("the '464 parent application"), which is in turn a  
21          continuation of application 09/262,781 ("the '781 grandparent application").

22          The inventive entity of the '464 parent application and of the '781  
23          grandparent application is the same as that of Singer's involved application.  
24          Singer's involved application contains a specific reference to the '464 parent  
25          application, which contains a specific reference to the '781 grandparent  
26          application. Singer's involved application was at one time copending with the  
27          '464 parent application, which was at one time copending with the '781  
28          grandparent application. Other than a specific reference to related patent  
29          applications and the content of original claims filed together with the respective

1 applications, the disclosures of Singer’s involved application, the ‘464 parent  
2 application, and the ‘781 grandparent application are the same. None of these facts  
3 is in dispute. Party Ding does not disagree with party Singer that the reference,  
4 inventive entity, copendency, and disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120 are  
5 all met with respect to claims 27 and 28 of Singer’s involved application in relation  
6 to the ‘464 parent application and the ‘781 grandparent application.

7 What is in dispute is party Ding’s assertion that the effective filing date  
8 provision of 35 U.S.C. § 120 does not apply to determining the date Singer’s  
9 involved application was filed for purposes of applying 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2).

10 Ding argues (Motion at 1):

11 We submit that if Congress had intended that the language  
12 “application filed after” appearing in 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2) be  
13 governed by either (or both) 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) or 35 U.S.C. 120,  
14 Congress would have made a specific reference to those sections in  
15 the statute, as it had when it amended 35 U.S.C. 154 approximately  
16 five years earlier. Congress did not, so 35 U.S.C. 135(b)(2) does not.

17  
18 35 U.S.C. 154 sets the term of a patent to begin “on the date on  
19 which the patent issues” and to end “20 years from the date on which  
20 the application for patent was filed in the United States.” The term  
21 “filed” in 35 U.S.C. 154 is intended to refer (just as it does in 35  
22 U.S.C. 135(b)(2)) to the actual -- not the effective -- filing date of the  
23 application. The meaning for the term “filed” is made clear by the  
24 subsequent phrase recited in section 154, i.e., “or, if the application  
25 contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application, or  
26 applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this title, from the  
27 date on which the earliest such application was filed.” This  
28 subsequent phrase would be completely redundant in the statute if the  
29 earlier reference to the date on which the application was filed was  
30 instead a reference to the effective filing date of the application.

31  
32 We need not address 35 U.S.C. § 119. The language of 35 U.S.C. § 120 is

1 clear in specifying an “effective” filing date which may be earlier than an  
2 application’s actual filing date, if certain conditions are met. No exception of any  
3 kind is mentioned or provided, for any special scenario or circumstance. The later  
4 application “shall have the same effect . . . as though filed on the date of the earlier  
5 application.” Ding’s argument is rejected with regard to 35 U.S.C. § 120.

6       The fact that in recently amending 35 U.S.C. § 154, a statutory section  
7 making reference to the date an application was filed in the United States,  
8 Congress included additional language for applying 35 U.S.C. § 120 to make  
9 significant and render effective an earlier filing date does not mean that Congress  
10 necessarily had to make an express reference to 35 U.S.C. § 120 each time 35  
11 U.S.C. § 120 would apply. Section 120, Title 35, United States Code, does not  
12 require another statutory section to make an express reference to it before its  
13 provision comes to life. There are many examples of applying the effective filing  
14 date of 35 U.S.C. 120 without any specific reference to 35 U.S.C. § 120. See, for  
15 instance, the date of filing of an application as referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), 35  
16 U.S.C. § 102(d), and 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Congress does not have to follow a fixed  
17 format in drafting legislation; it may choose to use redundant language, or not.  
18 Congress’ having made specific reference to 35 U.S.C. § 120 when amending 35  
19 U.S.C. § 154 does not indicate that 35 U.S.C. § 120 has to be expressly invoked to  
20 have application. That position is illogical and would mandate unnecessary  
21 redundancy throughout the statute.

22       It is not our role to legislate. We need not consider the various advantages  
23 and disadvantages articulated by the parties with regard to having 35 U.S.C. § 120  
24 apply or not apply in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2). The statutory language  
25 of 35 U.S.C. § 120 is clear and leaves no room for adding any scenario to which 35

1 U.S.C. § 120 does not apply. Since 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2) does not itself exclude  
2 the application of 35 U.S.C. § 120, the latter does have application in the context of  
3 the former.

4 For the foregoing reasons, we find that Singer's involved application is not  
5 an application filed after the January 17, 2002 publication date of Ding's published  
6 application US 2002/0006010. Singer's involved application has an effective  
7 filing date of March 4, 1999. Therefore, Singer's claims 27 and 28 are not made in  
8 an application that was filed after publication of Ding's published application. It is  
9 not necessary to proceed any further with regard to consideration of Ding's motion.

10 Ding's Motion 2 is **denied**.

11 Singer's Motion 1

12 In Motion 1, Singer seeks to designate Ding's claims 2-13 and 15-17 as  
13 corresponding to the count, and relies on the testimony of its technical witness, Dr.  
14 George Barbastathis in connection with various factual assertions. Ding argues  
15 that the testimony of Dr. Barbastathis should be given little or no weight because  
16 (1) not one of Dr. Barbastathis' many publications discusses acoustic noise  
17 management; (2) not one of Dr. Barabastathis' numerous publications is primarily  
18 directed to acoustic noise management or mechanical stability; (3) Dr. Barbastathis  
19 has had little, if any, practical experience with servo control of hard disk drives;  
20 and (4) "Dr. Barbastathis has conducted zero research, invented zero inventions,  
21 developed zero processes and designs, written zero articles, and taken part in zero  
22 proceedings with respect to proximate time-optimal servomechanisms (PTOS), to  
23 which the Ding patent is admittedly a modification" (Opp. page 3, lines 4-7).

24 The Federal Rules of Evidence applies in interference proceedings. 37 CFR  
25 § 41.152(a). Fed. R. Evid. 702 states:

1 Rule 702. Testimony by Experts

2  
3 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the  
4 trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,  
5 a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,  
6 training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or  
7 otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,  
8 (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,  
9 and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to  
10 the facts of the case.

11  
12 Ding's assertions, as noted above, even if assumed as true, are insufficient either to  
13 disqualify Dr. Barbastathis as a technical expert, or to dismiss the testimony of Dr.  
14 Barbastathis, categorically, as having little or no weight. Under Fed. R. Evid. 702,  
15 reproduced above, the qualifications for providing expert testimony is broad and  
16 flexible. They can be based on education, and not on experience. Or they can be  
17 based on experience, and not on education. They can even be based on knowledge  
18 not derived from either experience or formal education. There is also no  
19 requirement that the "expert" must have conducted research on any subject, much  
20 less a requirement that the "expert" must have made some invention on a subject or  
21 a requirement that the "expert" must have published articles in professional  
22 journals on anything.

23 For Dr. Barbastathis to give helpful testimony, it is not necessary that he  
24 published any papers primarily concerning acoustic management or mechanical  
25 stability, that he had practical working experience with servo control of hard disk  
26 drives, that he conducted research, developed designs, or participated in projects  
27 with respect to proximate time-optimal servomechanisms (PTOS). Ding's  
28 approach to the issue is misplaced. Ding should have focused on the nature and

1 character of the experiences possessed by Dr. Barbastathis, the subject matter on  
2 which Dr. Barbastathis has published papers, the inventions Dr. Barbastathis did  
3 make, the designs which he did develop, and explain why such collection of  
4 experiences, education, and achievements should be deemed so irrelevant to the  
5 subject matter of this interference that the testimony of Dr. Barbastathis should be,  
6 categorically, accorded little or no weight. That, however, was not done.  
7 The key is adequate background to say something helpful on the topic, not actual  
8 practical experience, invention, or research on the precise topic. Ding's argument  
9 that the testimony of Dr. George Barbastathis should be, categorically, given little  
10 or no weight is rejected.

11 During oral argument, the panel pointed out to Ding's counsel that even  
12 Ding's own expert does not disagree with Dr. Barbastathis on the facts concerning  
13 some Ding claims which Singer seeks to have designated as corresponding to the  
14 count, and inquired as to what, in Ding's view, should happen in that situation.  
15 Counsel for Ding replied (Transcript 51):

16 well, to the extent our expert doesn't disagree with theirs and the  
17 board finds that their expert is deserving of some weight, then those  
18 claims would have to be added to the count.  
19

20 We find that the testimony of Dr. Barbastathis concerning technical facts is  
21 entitled to some weight, based on his education, experience, and skills as outlined  
22 in his curriculum vitae. Also, Ding has not, in its opposition and in connection  
23 with its claims 2, 3, and 15-17, pointed to any testimony of its own technical  
24 expert, Mr. William H. Ray, which contradicts those of Dr. Barbastathis in support  
25 of designating Ding's claims 2, 3, and 15-17 as corresponding to the count.  
26 Accordingly, with respect to Ding's claims 2, 3, and 15-17, Singer's Motion 1 is

1 **granted**.

2 With respect to Ding's claim 4, Singer's Motion 1 is **denied**, because the motion  
3 lacks any discussion or analysis of why Ding's claim 4 should be designated as  
4 corresponding to the count.

5 Singer argues that each of Ding's claims 11-13 should be designated as  
6 corresponding to the count. Claim 11 depends from claim 1 and each of claims 12  
7 and 13 depend from claim 11. Claims 1 and 11 read as follows:

8 1. A method of operating a disc drive for improved acoustic  
9 management, comprising steps of:

10

11 (a) receiving an acoustic/performance compromising factor  
12 from a host;

13

14 (b) tuning performance of a disc drive according to the  
15 compromising factor, the step of tuning including applying the  
16 compromising factor to at least one control parameter for the disk  
17 drive to generate at least one modified control parameter; and

18

19 (c) executing a control loop for controlling an operation of the  
20 disk drive, the control loop using the at least one modified control  
21 parameter.

22

23 11. The method of claim 1, wherein the control loop includes a  
24 velocity profile generator for generating a desired velocity based on a  
25 difference between an actual and a target position, and the tuning step  
26 (b) includes (b)(i) modifying the desired velocity.

27

28 At the outset, it is noted that Ding's claim 1 is not the same as Ding's claim  
29 14 and that only Ding's claim 14 is an alternative of the count, not Ding's claim 1.  
30 Singer's arguments in connection with this motion evidently presumes either that  
31 Ding's claim 1 is an alternative in the count or that it reads the same as Ding's

1 claim 14 which is an alternative in the count. But neither is true. The failure to  
2 account for the differences between Ding's claim 1 and Ding's claim 14 is alone  
3 sufficient basis on which to deny Singer's motion, no matter how small Ding  
4 believes the differences are. Accordingly, with respect to claims 11-13, the motion  
5 is **denied**.

6 Alternatively, even if Singer's failure to account for the differences between  
7 Ding's claim 1 and Ding's claim 14 is somehow ignored or overlooked, with  
8 respect to claims 11-13 the motion still would be denied, for reasons discussed  
9 below.

10 Singer first cites to 24 lines of the Pirzadeh patent (Patent 6,624,964) and the  
11 states (Motion at 8-9):

12 The process 93 performed by the servo controller 56 generates a  
13 desired normalized velocity signal  $V_r + FC$  which is added to forward  
14 feed value FC "to correct for any deviations" in velocity and position.  
15 The resulting current value  $I_c$  is derated (i.e., a deration value is  
16 applied to  $I_c$ ) in a process 94. See Pirzadeh, Exhibit 1012, paragraph  
17 bridging columns 7 and 8. See MF (40).

18  
19 The above-quoted assertion of Singer is not reasonably understandable,  
20 given Figure 5 of Pirzadeh and its corresponding disclosure. Singer's assertions  
21 are incoherent and full of mistakes. First, in Pirzadeh's disclosure the normalized  
22 velocity signal is  $V_r$  (Pirzadeh 7:16-17), not  $V_r + FC$  according to the above-quoted  
23 argument of Singer. And if we remove the incorrect reference to FC as a part of  
24 the normalized velocity signal, the above-quoted assertions still incorrectly  
25 identifies process 93 as generating the normalized velocity signal  $V_r$ . It is process  
26 91 and not process 93 which generates  $V_r$ . (Pirzadeh 7:2-6, Figure 5).

1           And further if we were to ignore Pirzadeh’s disclosure and thus regard the  
2 sum of  $V_r$  and FC as the desired normalized velocity as Singer apparently asserts,  
3 Singer nowhere points out what, then, in Pirzadeh qualifies as the “velocity profile  
4 generator” required by claim 11. The velocity reference table 90 in Pirzadeh’s  
5 Figure 5 which takes as input the difference between an actual and a target  
6 position, as is required by claim 11, cannot be the velocity profile generator  
7 because the output from the table is not the sum of  $V_r$  and FC.

8           Even if  $V_r$  is regarded as the desired normalized signed velocity, the velocity  
9 reference table 90 cannot be the claimed velocity profile generator because  $V_r$  is  
10 not generated by the velocity reference table. Singer has failed to identify a  
11 velocity profile generator in Pirzadeh that satisfies all the requirements of the  
12 velocity profile generator of claim 11. Note that claim 14 as an alternative of the  
13 count does not recite a velocity profile generator.

14           In any event, we read “modifying the desired velocity” such that it means a  
15 new desired velocity is provided based on the modification. Ding is correct in  
16 noting that Pirzadeh’s velocity reference table 90 cannot be the claimed velocity  
17 profile generator, because its output is immediately used to generate a ratio relative  
18 to another variable. The ratio or quotient is no longer of the same nature and  
19 character as the original desired velocity. The desired velocity is necessarily  
20 unchanged in that scenario.

21           Because the differences between claim 11 and both the count and Pirzadeh  
22 as applicable prior art have not been properly identified, and also because Singer’s  
23 characterization of Pirzadeh’s disclosure is unpersuasive as discussed above, the  
24 motion with respect to claims 11-13 is alternatively **denied** on those basis.

25

1 Singer argues that each of Ding's claims 5-10 should be designated as  
2 corresponding to the count. The count in this interference is defined as Ding's  
3 claim 14 or Singer's claim 28, in the alternative. Ding's claims 5-10 do not  
4 depend from claim 14. Rather, claims 5, 7, and 9 each depend from claim 1; claim  
5 8 depends from claim 7; and claim 10 depends from claim 9. Singer's motion  
6 lacks any analysis directed to the differences between Ding's claim 1 and claim 14.  
7 Those differences may not be ignored, since each dependent claim by operation of  
8 law includes all the features of the claim on which it depends. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 4<sup>th</sup>  
9 Paragraph. Singer has failed to consider the entirety of the differences between  
10 claims 5-10 and the count. The fact that claim 1 was designated as corresponding  
11 to the count at the outset of this interference does not mean all of its differences  
12 from the count may be assumed to be non-existent when determining the  
13 differences between each of claims 5-10 from the count. Singer may not divide  
14 each claim into two parts and properly assert that if the first part by itself would  
15 have been obvious and if the second part by itself would have been obvious then  
16 the combination of the first and the second parts would have been obvious. The  
17 entirety of the differences must be acknowledged in a single analysis.

18 Accordingly, with respect to Ding's claims 5-10, the motion is **denied**.

19 D. Conclusion

20 Ding's Motion 1 is **denied**.

21 Ding's Motion 2 is **denied**.

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1 Singer's Motion 1 is **granted-in-part**. The motion is granted with respect to  
2 Ding's claims 2, 3, and 15-17. The motion is denied with respect to Ding's claim  
3 4-13.

/Jameson Lee/ )  
JAMESON LEE )  
Administrative Patent Judge )  
 ) BOARD OF PATENT  
 )  
/Sally C. Medley ) APPEALS AND  
SALLY C. MEDLEY )  
Administrative Patent Judge ) INTERFERENCES  
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Interference No. 105,436  
Ding v. Singer

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