

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today
was **not** written for publication in and
is **not** binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

Ex parte DAVID S. HISHINUMA, KEN G. ROBERTSON,
DUSTIN ROSING, RICHARD W. DAVIS,
HAROLD MIYAMURA and JORGE E. ROCABADO

Appeal No. 2006-0476
Application No. 10/365,258

ON BRIEF

Before OWENS, LEVY, and NAPPI, **Administrative Patent Judges**.

NAPPI, **Administrative Patent Judge**.

DECISION ON APPEAL

This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. §134(a) of the final rejection of claims 1 through 4, 6 through 15, 17 and 19 through 42, which constitute all the claims in the application. For the reasons stated *infra* we affirm-in-part the examiner's rejection of these claims.

Invention

The invention relates to a label that can be pulled out from the surface of computer equipment. The label is captive to the equipment and contains both preprinted information and user provided information. See page 2 and figure 2 of appellants' specification.

Claims 23 is representative of the invention and reproduced below:

23. A label for use in equipment having a bezel, said bezel adapted for attachment to a surface of said equipment, said surface being accessible by a user during operation of said equipment without moving said equipment, said label comprising:

a distal portion and a proximal portion;

a flat surface formed between said distal and proximal portions, said flat surface adapted for displaying material to a user when said label is pulled out of said bezel;

said label proximal portion including a pull, said pull operative for assisting a user in pulling said label out of said bezel a distance to allow said user to view material on said label;

said label having a sleeve for controlling the maximum travel of said label distal portion relative to the front surface of said bezel; and

wherein said bezel portion is removable without removing said label from said equipment.

References

The references relied upon by the examiner are:

Fox et al. (Fox)	6,431,512	August 13, 2002
Seabrook	6,186,552	February 13, 2001
Newhouse	5,700,051	December 23, 1997

The additional references we rely upon are:

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Nykoluk et al (Nykoluk)	6,629,588	October 7, 2003
Dinkin	6,442,018	August 27, 2002
Victorinox, Swiss Army, Web page advertising Tracking ID tag.		

Rejection at Issue

Claims 23 through 26 and 29 through 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Newhouse.

Claims 12 through 15, 17, 19, 20 and 32 through 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Fox.

Claims 27 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Newhouse.

Claims 1 through 4, and 6 through 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Newhouse in view of Seabrook.

Claims 21, 22 and 36 through 42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over Fox.

Throughout the opinion we make reference to the briefs, the answer and the final Office action for the respective details thereof.

Opinion

We have carefully considered the subject matter on appeal, the rejections advanced by the examiner and the evidence of anticipation and obviousness relied upon by the examiner as support for the rejections. We have, likewise, reviewed and taken into consideration, in reaching our decision, appellants' arguments set forth in the briefs along with the examiner's rationale in support of the rejections and arguments in rebuttal set forth in the examiner's answer.

With full consideration being given to the subject matter on appeal, the examiner's rejections and the arguments of appellants and the examiner, and for the reasons stated *infra* we sustain the examiner's rejection of claims 29 and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102. However we will not sustain the examiner's rejections of claims 12 through 15, 17, 19, 20, 23 through 26, 31 through 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 102, nor will we sustain the examiner's rejections of claims 1 through 4, 6 through 11, 21, 22, 27, 28 and 36 through 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Additionally, we enter a new ground of rejection against claims 1, 12, 23, 24, 29, 32 and 40.

Rejections based upon Newhouse.

Newhouse teaches an information card mounted to a chair. The information card, item 14, which the examiner equates to the label, is mounted below the chair in a holder 12. See figures 1 through 3 and column 2 lines 23 through 33. The card has a flat surface, a distal end and a proximal end with a pull. See figures 5A and 5B. The card is made of plastic and has a member 22, which moves, in slot 24 of the holder to limit the travel of the card. See column 2, lines 31 through 33 and 58 through 62. The holder is attached to the chair through double-sided tape or other fasteners. See column 2, lines 63 through 67

Seabrook teaches a wristband which contains memorandum that a user may change. See column 1, lines 54 through 59 and figure 1. The

memorandum recording medium comprises an erasable surface divided into a plurality of sections. See column 4, lines 36 through 43 and figure 3.

Rejection of claims 1 through 4 and 6 through 11

Appellants argue, on pages 14 and 15 of the brief, that one would not be motivated to combine Newhouse and Seabrook as asserted by the examiner. Appellants reason that Newhouse provides no discussion of receiving information on the label and Seabrook is intended to be portable. Further, appellants argue that such a combination would defeat Seabrook's purpose, of making the information visible, as Newhouse's label holder is hidden most of the time.

The examiner argues, in response, on page 9 of the answer: "Seabrook teaches applying information to a label area. Newhouse teaches a label with information. It would have been obvious to utilize such an area so that the user of the Newhouse device may make their own notations on the label, particularly if the label involves the use of equipment."

We concur with the examiner regarding the user making notations on the device of Newhouse. However, we do not find objective evidence in either reference that would suggest to the skilled artisan that Newhouse should be modified to contain a dedicated area of said label as recited in claim 1. Claim 1 recites "receiving, from said user, information on a dedicated area of said label when said label is pulled out of said opening." In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Examiner bears the initial burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of obviousness. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443,

1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). **See also *In re Piasecki***, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It is the burden of the examiner to establish why one having ordinary skill in the art would have been led to the claimed invention by the express teachings or suggestions found in the prior art, or by the implication contained in such teachings or suggestions. ***In re Sernaker*** 702 F.2d 989, 995, 217 USPQ 1, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1983). “The motivation, suggestion or teaching may come explicitly from statements in the prior art, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some cases the nature of the problem to be solved.” ***In re Huston*** 308 F.3d 1267, 1278, 64 USPQ2d 1801, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 2002, citing ***In re Kotzab*** 217 F.3d 1365, 1370, 55 USPQ 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Newhouse teaches a label that is hidden when not used. Seabrook is concerned with providing a visible reminder to a user. Thus, as the appellants argue, the purposes of the references are at odds. Further, in as much as the combination is limited to adding a dedicated area for the user to enter information, Newhouse provides no insight into why a user would want to add information to the label. Further, we find no disclosure in Seabrook as to why the memorandum area is divided into sections, though it appears that these sections are to provide order to the information. Thus, we do not find that the references provide a suggestion to make the combination asserted by the examiner, nor do we find that the nature of the problem to be solved by the references provides the suggestion to modify the references as asserted by the examiner. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 4 and 6 through 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

Rejection of claims 23, 25 through 28 and 35

Appellants argue, on page 7 of the brief, that Newhouse does not teach that the “ bezel portion is removable without removing said label from said equipment” as recited in claim 23. Appellants reason that Newhouse’s holder, item 12, which the examiner equates with the claimed bezel can not be removed without removing the label from the chair on which it is attached, which the examiner equates with the claimed equipment.

The examiner responds on page 6 of the answer:

[T]he bezel is not actually part of the claimed invention. The invention is the label. Applicant’s discussion of the bezel describes the intended use of the label. The label in Newhouse is capable of being used in that manner. Arguments regarding the bezel of Newhouse not being removable without removing the label are narrower than the instant claim language.

We disagree with the examiner’s claim interpretation. We consider the claim to be awkward as it recites “ A label ... said label comprising... wherein said bezel portion ...”, the bezel is not disclosed as being part of the part of the label, but rather the equipment on which the label is mounted and we accordingly enter a new ground of rejection 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Nonetheless, claim 23 does recite that the equipment upon which the label is mounted contains a bezel from which the label can be pulled out of and that the bezel is removable without removing the label from the equipment. We do not find that Newhouse teaches a bezel, which is removable without removing the label from the equipment, the chair. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of independent claims 23,

25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 102, nor will we sustain the examiner's rejections of claims 27, 28 and 35 U.S.C. § 103.

Rejection of claim 24.

Appellants argue, on pages 8 and 9 of the brief, that Newhouse does not teach the claim 24 limitation of “[a] label for use in equipment having a bezel... said label having a sleeve ... wherein said sleeve is mounted independent from said bezel.”

The examiner's response, on page 7 of the answer, is similar to that provided regarding claim 23.

As with claim 23, we disagree with the examiner's claim interpretation. Unlike claim 23, we do consider claim 24 to be definite. Claim 24 recites “said label having a sleeve for controlling the maximum travel of said label distal portion relative to the front surface of said bezel, wherein said sleeve is mounted independent from said bezel,” the bezel of the equipment is recited in the preamble of the claim as a part of the equipment. On page 3 of the answer, the examiner equates Newhouse's slot, item 24 with the claimed sleeve. We do not find that Newhouse teaches that the holder 12, which includes the slot 24, is removable from the chair, without removing the label from the chair. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner's rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

Rejection of claims 29 through 31.

Appellants argue, on page 9 of the brief: “*Newhouse* does not teach, nor does the Final Office Action allege in its rejection of claim 29 that *Newhouse* teaches its label being adapted to receive information from the user.”

In response, on page 7 of the answer, the examiner asserts, “*Newhouse* does not teach the label as receiving information, yet the label is still capable of (and “adapted to”) doing so.”

We concur with the examiner. Claim 29 recites the limitation “wherein at least a portion of said label flat surface is adapted to receive information from a user.” Appellants’ specification, on page 4, identifies that the label has a flat surface that the user can add information. The additional information can be added by the user by tags attached with hook and loop fasteners, tags mounted on slides or by writing on the label. Thus, we find that the scope of claim 29 includes that the label can be written upon by the user, but is not limited to actually having writing by the user, i.e. this limitation is broad enough to encompass almost anything a person could scribble upon with a pen or pencil. We find that the information card of *Newhouse* is disclosed as being flat and able to be seen by the user of the chair. As can be seen from figure 5A in *Newhouse* the label may have blank space. We find no disclosure *Newhouse* of a device or mechanism which prevents a person from writing on the label, thus we find that *Newhouse* is adapted receive information from the user. Accordingly, we sustain the examiner’s rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C.

§ 102.

Appellants argue, on page 9 of the brief, that Newhouse does not teach a portion of the information on the label is removable as claimed in claim 30.

We disagree with appellants. Claim 30 is dependent upon claim 29 and further recites “wherein a portion of the information is removable.” We note that the claim 29 does not specifically recite that the label has information, rather that it is “adapted to receive information.” Thus, in context claim 30 recites that the label is adapted to receive removable information. Thus claim 30 does not actually recite that the label contains removable information provided by a user and is broad enough to encompass a person scribbling upon the label with a non-permanent pen or pencil. As discussed *supra* we find that the label of Newhouse is so adapted. Accordingly, we sustain the examiner’s rejection of claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

Appellants argue, on page 10 of the brief, that Newhouse does not teach that the information comprises reusable alpha numerics.

We concur with appellants. In claim 31, is dependent upon claim 29 and further recites “wherein a portion of said information comprises reusable alpha numerics.” Thus, claim 31 recites that the label is adapted to receive reusable alpha numerics. These alpha numerics correspond to appellants’ information tags attached by hook and loop fasteners or hooked on slides disclosed in the specification. We find the scope of this claim to be limited to the label receiving reusable alpha numerics. We do not find that Newhouse teaches any structure, which is able to receive such reusable alpha numerics. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

Rejection of claims 32 and 33

Appellants argue, on page 10 of the brief:

Independent claim 32 recites “a modifiable label containing information pertaining to at least a portion of the equipment, wherein said information changes from time to time.” However, figures 5A and 5B in *Newhouse* disclose a label consumed with operational instructions and does not teach the label as being modifiable from time to time. Furthermore, *Newhouse* does not disclose the operational instruction of the chair would ever change, thereby giving no reason to change the information printed on the card.

In response, the examiner argues, on page 8 of the brief “similar to claim 26, the markings of *Newhouse* are capable of being changed.”

We disagree with the examiner. Claim 32 recites “a modifiable label containing information pertaining to at least a portion of the equipment, wherein the information changes from time to time.” Our reviewing court has said, “[w]here the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.” *In re Gulack* 703 F.2d 1381, 1385, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983). We consider the “information” on the label to be non-functional descriptive material. As such, the contents of the information alone will not render the claim patentable, i.e., that the information pertains to the equipment is immaterial. Nonetheless, claim 32 does recite that the information changes over time. We find no disclosure in *Newhouse* that the information changes over time. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of independent claim 32

under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Newhouse. Claim 33 is dependent upon 32 and we similarly will not sustain the examiner's rejection.

Rejection of claim 34

On page 3 of the answer, the examiner rejects claim 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Newhouse. Claim 34 is dependent upon claim 12. The examiner has not asserted, nor do we find that claim 12 is anticipated by Newhouse. As claim 34 necessarily includes all of the limitations of claim 12, we will not sustain the examiner's rejection of claim 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Newhouse.

Rejections based upon Fox

Fox teaches a keyboard tray assembly, item 10, with a housing, item 30, for an instruction card, item 32. The card assembly includes a spacer plate, item 31, which has two shoulders, item 50. See column 4, lines 45 through 64 and figure 4. The instruction card item 32 also has two lugs or stops, items 58. See column 5, lines 19 through 30 and figure 5. Removal of the card is prevented by the interaction of the shoulders of the spacer plate and the lugs on the card. See column 6, lines 46 through 48.

Rejection of claim 12 through 15, 17, 19, 20 and 34.

Appellants argue on page 10 of the brief, that Fox does not teach the claim 12 limitation of "at least one support structure for supporting said label ...

wherein said support structure is mounted independent from said bezel.”

Appellants argue that if assembly 30 is the claimed bezel, the card is not supported separately from the bezel as the lugs 58 prevent the card from being removed.

In response, on page 8 of the answer, the examiner states, “the bezel is not part of the claimed invention.”

We disagree with the examiner’s claim interpretation. Claim 12 recites a “device comprising; a label operative for moving in and out of a bezel arranged on a periphery of said computer equipment, ... at least one support structure for supporting said label both when said label is within said computer equipment and pulled out from said computer equipment , wherein said support structure is mounted independent from said bezel.” Thus, we find that claim 12 does recite that the computer equipment contains a bezel and that the label support structure is mounted independent of the bezel. The examiner has not identified in either the statement of rejection, on pages 5 and 6 of the answer, or the response to arguments, on pages 6 through 9 of the answer, which elements of Fox correspond to the claimed bezel. We do not find any structure in Fox, which corresponds to the claimed bezel, which is mounted independently of the label support structure. Accordingly, we will now sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 12 through 15, 17, 19, 20 and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

Rejection of claims 32 and 33.

Appellants argue, on page 12 of the answer, that Fox does not teach the claim 32 limitation of “a modifiable label containing information pertaining to at

least a portion of the equipment, wherein the information changes from time to time.” Appellants reason that Fox’s label contains instructions provided by the manufacturer and provides no suggestion that the label can be modified.

In response, the examiner states on page 8 of the answer:

The label in Fox is considered to be modifiable in that it “may be” altered. Regarding the information as changing, the card is described as containing instructions, or instructional information, which changes from device to device. Fox teaches this in the first paragraph of column 7.

We disagree with the examiner. As discussed *supra*, we consider the “information” on the label to be non-functional descriptive material, as such the contents of the information alone will not render the claim patentable, i.e. that the information pertains to the equipment is immaterial. Nonetheless, claim 32 does recite that the information changes over time. We do not find that Fox’s disclosure in the first paragraph of column 7 teaches that the information contained on the label changes over time. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 32 and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Fox.

Rejection of claim 35.

On page 5 of the answer, the examiner rejects claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Fox. Claim 35 is dependent upon claim 23. The examiner has not asserted, nor do we find that claim 23 is anticipated by Fox. As claim 35 necessarily includes all of the limitations of claim 23 we will not

sustain the examiner's rejection of claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Fox.

Rejection of claims 21, 22, 36 through 39.

Appellants argue, on page 13 of the brief, that the rejection of claims 21, 22 and 36 through 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Fox is improper for the reasons asserted with respect to independent claims 12 and 32.

We concur. In rejecting these claims, the examiner has provided no additional evidence, which overcomes the deficiencies in the rejection of claims 12 and 32 noted above. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner's rejection of claims 21, 22 and 36 through 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

Rejection of claims 40 through 42.

Appellants argue, on pages 13 and 14 of the brief, that Fox does not teach or suggest the claim 40 limitation of " a label containing information pertaining to at least one attribute of at least a portion of the computer equipment, wherein said at least one attribute changes from time to time and wherein said label is adaptable to contain information reflecting said changes." Appellants reason that Fox is concerned with a keyboard support which has no changing attributes as such one would not expect the information to change over time and that Fox does not teach that the card is modifiable.

We concur with appellants. However, as noted above with respect to claim 32 which contains similar limitations, we consider the “information” on the label to be non-functional descriptive material, as such the contents of the information alone will not render the claim patentable, i.e. that the information pertains to the equipment is immaterial. Nonetheless, claim 40 does recite that the information changes over time. We find no teaching or suggestion in Fox that the information changes over time. Accordingly, we will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of independent claim 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being anticipated by Fox. Claim 41 and 42 are dependent upon 40 and we similarly will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of these claims.

New Grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 CFR § 41.50(b)

We apply a new grounds of rejection against representative independent claims 1, 12, 23, 24, 29, 32 and 40. We leave it to the examiner to consider whether similar rejections apply to the other claims in the application. As stated *supra* we reject claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 second paragraph. We reject claims 23 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Nykoluk and we reject claims 1, 29 and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nykoluk and we reject claims 1, 12 and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Dinkin in view of Nykoluk.

Nykoluk discloses a retractable identification card for a piece of baggage. The baggage has a bezel, exterior portion item 66 shown in figures 1 through 4. The identification tag is contained in a holder, item 70 shown in figures 8 through 12. The tag has a flat surface that displays information to a user when the holder is pulled out of said bezel. See figure 2, and column 1, lines 56 through 65. The label holder has pull or tab, arch item 130, to pull the holder from the bezel. See column 6, lines 4 through 7. The label holder makes use of a sleeve, item 70, which prevents the label holder from being fully removed, the barbs item 134 of holder 70 prevent the holder from being removed. See column 6, lines 29 through 33. The sleeve, item 70 is mounted to receptacle item 72, which is independent from the bezel (exterior portion), item 66. Hence, the bezel is removable without removing the label from the equipment. Thus, we find that Nykoluk anticipates claims 23 and 24.

With regard to claims 29 and 32, which contain limitations directed to the modification of the information on the label, we note that Nykoluk teaches that the information card can be made of paper, cardboard or plastic and contain information to associate the bag with the person. See column 6, lines 48 through 59. As paper is notoriously well known as being “adapted to receive information from a user,” Nykoluk strongly suggests that the label is modifiable by the user as claimed in claim 29. Nonetheless, we note that it is common in the art of luggage tags to provide a blank card, or tag, with pre-printed headers such as “Name” and “Address” with a luggage tag. Such a tag provides areas for user modifiable

information, which changes from time to time (people's address often change). See for example the provided web page advertisement for Victorinox Swiss Army "Tracking ID Tag." We find that one skilled in the art would recognize that such a pre-printed tag should be included with the identification holder of Nykoluk. With regard to claim 1 which recites the user inserting information when the label is in the withdrawn position, Nykoluk teaches in figure 11 and column 6, line 60 that the information card is inserted into the holder when the holder is in the extended position.

Dinkin teaches an integrated briefcase-computer, i.e. a briefcase that has a computer integrated therein. See Abstract and column 1, lines 62 through 67. Dinkin teaches that the briefcase-computer may have many of the features of a common briefcase such as wheels, telescoping handle, business card holders, etc. See column 4, line 61 through column 5, line 4. Dinkin does not however teach that the briefcase-computer may have an identification card. As discussed *supra* Nykoluk teaches a piece of baggage similar in appearance to that of Dinkin, where there is an identification card in a retractable holder. We consider that one skilled in the art viewing both references would consider modifying Dinkin to include the retracting identification card holder in of Nykoluk as it provides an identification card holder that does not detract from the aesthetic appearance of the briefcase.

Regarding claim 12, Dinkin teaches a computer. As discussed *supra*, Nykoluk teaches a label operative to move in and out of a bezel with stops and support structure, which is, mounted independent of the bezel. With regard to claim 40, as discussed *supra* the information on a luggage tag is considered to change from time to time. Further, though the information on a luggage tag may be different from information pertaining to an attribute of the computer equipment¹ as stated *supra*, the claimed information does not functionally relate to the claimed “device for storing information.” As such the information on the label will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.

Conclusion

This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 CFR § 41.50(b) (effective September 13, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 49960 (August 12, 2004), 1286 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 21 (September 7, 2004)). 37 CFR § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”

37 CFR § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:

- (1) *Reopen prosecution*. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so

¹ We make no findings as to whether the scope of the phrase “attribute of the computer equipment” includes the identification of the owner of the equipment.

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rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . .

(2) *Request rehearing.* Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . .

We sustain the examiner's rejection of claims 29 and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102. However we will not sustain the examiner's rejections of claims 12 through 15, 17, 19, 20, 23 through 26, 31 through 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 102, nor will we sustain the examiner's rejections of claims 1 through 4, 6, through 11, 21, 22, 27, 28 and 36 through 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Additionally, we enter a new ground of rejection against claims 1, 12, 23, 24, 29, 32 and 40.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR § 1.136(a) (1) (iv).

REVERSED; 37 CFR § 41.50(b)

TERRY J. OWENS)	
Administrative Patent Judge)	
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)	BOARD OF PATENT
STUART S. LEVY)	APPEALS AND
Administrative Patent Judge)	INTERFERENCES
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