

1 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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4 BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
5 AND INTERFERENCES
6 _____

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8 *Ex parte* JAY S. WALKER, JOHN M. PACKES, JR., DANIEL E.
9 TEDESCO, STEPHEN C. TULLEY, KEITH BEMER,
10 and JAMES A. JORASCH
11 _____

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13 Appeal 2007-2578
14 Application 10/642,894
15 Technology Center 3600
16 _____

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18 Decided: February 15, 2008
19 _____

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21 Before WILLIAM F. PATE, III, HUBERT C. LORIN, and
22 ANTON W. FETTING, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

23
24 FETTING, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

25 DECISION ON APPEAL
26 STATEMENT OF CASE

27 Jay S. Walker, John M. Packes, Jr., Daniel E. Tedesco, Stephen C.
28 Tulley, Keith Bemer, and James A. Jorasch (Appellants) seek review under

1 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a non-final rejection of claims 77-90, the only claims
2 pending in the application on appeal.

3 We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)
4 (2002).

5
6 We AFFIRM.

7 The Appellants invented a potential buyer identification system that
8 encourages potential buyers to provide individual, specific demand
9 information. A potential buyer provides a description of an item he intends
10 to purchase and a time period in which the item is to be purchased. In
11 exchange for the information provided, the potential buyer is offered a
12 reward, such as a gift or a discount. The value of the reward may be based
13 upon the amount and specificity of the information provided by the potential
14 buyer, and/or the value of this information to sellers. When a description of
15 the item is provided, the potential buyer is prompted to provide a payment
16 identifier, such as a credit card or a debit card number, so that the system
17 may apply a penalty to the potential buyer's financial account for failure to
18 purchase the item within the specified time period (Specification 2:20-35).

19 An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
20 exemplary claim 77, which is reproduced below [bracketed matter and some
21 paragraphing added].

22 77. A method for identifying potential buyers, comprising the
23 steps of:

24 [1] receiving intent data from a potential buyer,

25 wherein the intent data identifies an item

26 the potential buyer intends to purchase

1 We also discuss the following art in this Decision.

2 State of Arizona, SB1154-422R-H Ver, Real Estate Time Shares, 1996.¹
3 Options Clearing Corporation, Characteristics and Risks of Standardized
4 Options, 1994.²

5 REJECTIONS

6 Claims 77, 78, 81, and 82 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
7 anticipated by Ring.

8 Claims 79, 80, and 83-88 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
9 unpatentable over Ring.

10 Claims 89 and 90 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
11 unpatentable over Abecassis and Ring.

12 ISSUES

13 The issues pertinent to this appeal are

- 14 • Whether the Appellants have sustained their burden of showing that
15 the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 77, 78, 81, and 82 under 35
16 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Ring.
- 17 • Whether the Appellants have sustained their burden of showing that
18 the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 79, 80, and 83-88 under 35
19 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Ring.

¹ SB1154 - 422R - H Ver (1996) at
<http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/42leg/2r/bills/sb1154h.htm>.

² <http://www.optionsclearing.com/publications/risks/riskstoc.pdf>.

1 04. The disclosure contains no lexicographic definition of
2 “penalty.”

3 05. The ordinary and customary meaning of “penalty” is (1) a
4 punishment established by law or authority for a crime or offense;
5 (2) something required as a forfeit for an offense; (3) the
6 disadvantage or painful consequences resulting from an action or
7 condition; (4) within sports, a punishment, handicap, or loss of
8 advantage imposed on a team or competitor for infraction of a
9 rule; (5) within sports, an infraction of a rule; or (6) within the
10 game of contract bridge, games points scored in contract bridge by
11 the opponents when the declarer fails to make a bid.³ Of these, the
12 only definitions within a commercial context, such as the claims,
13 are either something required as a forfeit for an offense and the
14 disadvantage or painful consequences resulting from an action or
15 condition.

16 06. The disclosure contains no lexicographic definition of “take
17 into account.”

18 07. The ordinary and customary meaning of the idiom “take into
19 account” is to take into consideration; allow for.³

20 *Ring*

21 08. Ring is a text book describing the practice of real estate
22 transactions.

23 09. Ring describes awarding of a contract to a buyer so long as the
24 buyer meets certain qualifications (Ring 65-67).

1 10. The buyer's entering into such a contract is evidence of the
2 buyer's intent to purchase the property so contracted.

3 11. Ring describes that such a contract should contain provisions as
4 to specificity of the property, certainty as to what are the
5 contingent elements, such as adequacy of title and availability of
6 financing elements that must be met before the contract will close,
7 and length of time until closing (Ring 66-83).

8 12. The buyer typically pays a 5-10% deposit against the contract
9 (Ring 76-77) and this deposit creates a lien against the property,
10 but this lien does not survive if the buyer defaults on the contract
11 (Ring 81).

12 13. Ring describes seller behavior as typically setting a price higher
13 than the market on the expectation that the price can be reduced if
14 necessary, and that such price reduction typically occurs (Ring
15 317). This behavior is one of iteratively negotiating price between
16 buyer and seller.

17 14. Ring describes as examples of the penalty a buyer may incur for
18 defaulting on a real estate contract, forfeiture of the deposit;
19 specific performance; or damages in the form of the difference
20 between contract price and actual value (Ring 86).

21 *Abecassis*

22 15. Abecassis is directed to a system where parties deposit funds in
23 an escrow that is under the control of an unrelated third party to
24 which the depositing party has effective access; at the time of a
25 purchase transaction, the other party (i.e. seller) elicits information

1 from the system to determine that the purchaser has a valid
2 account, and then verifies that the account has sufficient money to
3 cover the purchase. The conditions upon which the deposit will be
4 released are set (Abecassis 3:64 - 4:5).

5 *Knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art of real estate contracting*
6 *and selling*

7 16. It is conventional for contracts to make requirements of both
8 notice and performance on the parts of the parties.

9 17. In contracts, it is conventional to make provisions for partial
10 performance.

11 18. In contracts, it is conventional to verify that contract provisions
12 are met for the purpose of ensuring performance.

13 19. Many large construction companies retain an inventory of real
14 estate from which to sell.

15 20. A buyer who buys a similar property from the same seller may
16 be considered to have made partial performance against a contract.

17 PRINCIPLES OF LAW

18 *Claim Construction*

19 During examination of a patent application, pending claims are
20 given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
21 specification. *In re Prater* , 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969);
22 *In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr.*, 367 F.3d 1359, 1364, (Fed. Cir.
23 2004).

1 Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim
2 are not read into the claim. *E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.*, 343 F.3d
3 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted “in view of the
4 specification” without importing limitations from the specification into the
5 claims unnecessarily)

6 Although a patent applicant is entitled to be his or her own
7 lexicographer of patent claim terms, in *ex parte* prosecution it must be
8 within limits. *In re Corr*, 347 F.2d 578, 580 (CCPA 1965). The applicant
9 must do so by placing such definitions in the Specification with sufficient
10 clarity to provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with clear and precise
11 notice of the meaning that is to be construed. *See also In re Paulsen*, 30
12 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (although an inventor is free to define the
13 specific terms used to describe the invention, this must be done with
14 reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision; where an inventor chooses
15 to give terms uncommon meanings, the inventor must set out any
16 uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure so as to
17 give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change).

18 *Anticipation*

19 "A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
20 the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
21 art reference." *Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California*, 814 F.2d
22 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). "When a claim covers several structures or
23 compositions, either generically or as alternatives, the claim is deemed
24 anticipated if any of the structures or compositions within the scope of the
25 claim is known in the prior art." *Brown v. 3M*, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed.
26 Cir. 2001). "The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as

1 is contained in the ... claim." *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d
2 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by
3 the claim, but this is not an *ipsissimis verbis* test, i.e., identity of terminology
4 is not required. *In re Bond*, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

5 *Obviousness*

6 A claimed invention is unpatentable if the differences between it and
7 the prior art are "such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
8 obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
9 in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); *KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc.*, 127 S.Ct.
10 1727 (2007); *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1966).

11 In *Graham*, the Court held that that the obviousness analysis is
12 bottomed on several basic factual inquiries: "[(1)] the scope and content of
13 the prior art are to be determined; [(2)] differences between the prior art and
14 the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and [(3)] the level of ordinary skill
15 in the pertinent art resolved." 383 U.S. at 17. *See also KSR Int'l v. Teleflex*
16 *Inc.*, 127 S.Ct. at 1734. "The combination of familiar elements according to
17 known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
18 predictable results." *KSR*, at 1739.

19 "When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives
20 and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field
21 or in a different one. If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a
22 predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability." *Id.* at 1740.

23 "For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one
24 device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
25 improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
26 unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." *Id.*

1 Thus, the Appellants present us with issues regarding the construction
2 of a reward, whether a reward comprising money is issued, and whether the
3 final step of applying a penalty is within the scope of the claim.

4 The Specification does not explicitly define a reward (FF 01),
5 although the Specification does indicate that a discount is an example of a
6 reward (FF 03). Thus, we construe a reward according to its customary
7 meaning within a commercial context as in the claims, as being a satisfying
8 return or result (FF 02). According to this construction, the discount in the
9 form of a price reduction offered by the seller (FF 13), as well as the award
10 of the contract (FF 09) and the contingent provisions the buyer has the seller
11 insert into the contract (FF 11) are all examples of satisfying results and thus
12 are within the scope of the term “reward.” Of these, the discount is one
13 which comprises money, as in claim 77.

14 Thus, we find the Appellants have not overcome their burden of
15 showing error in the Examiner’s finding that the price reduction in Ring is a
16 reward. As the Examiner found, the seller issues this reward in the form of
17 conveying the property for a price lower than originally asked for (Answer
18 8). Since the property is conveyed for money, the reward is of the same
19 form as the consideration, *viz*, money.

20 We are left with the issue regarding step [5], which is the conditional
21 application of a penalty, predicated on a buyer not buying within a time
22 period. The Appellants’ argument that the alternative in which the
23 application of no penalty is outside the scope of the claim, appears to
24 confuse a conditioning step with a conditional step. A conditioning step is
25 simply an affirmative step that conditions the process for further execution.
26 See for example claim 1 in *Bell v Hoffman*, 64 F.2d 134, 134 (CCPA 1933),

1 in which a step conditions concrete for transportation. The Appellants
2 appear to be arguing that the “if” clause in step [5] is a conditioning step for
3 the subsequent application of a penalty.

4 A conditional step is one which occurs if a condition is present. If the
5 condition is not present, then the step is optional. “Optional elements do not
6 narrow the claim” *In re Scott E. Johnston*, 435 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
7 2006).

8 Had the Appellants meant to apply the condition of the buyer not
9 buying within the time period, the last step would have been two steps, the
10 contents of the “if” clause setting up the condition required for the penalty.
11 But that is not the form in which the claim is drafted. Instead, the omission
12 of the buying within the time period is not a step, but a condition that, if met,
13 requires the penalty step. That is, the “if clause” posits a context that might
14 occur, but does not affirmatively create that context. If the condition is
15 unmet, the penalty step is optional. In the case of a buyer actually buying
16 the property in Ring, this condition would be unmet, leaving step [5] in
17 claim 77 optional, and does not narrow the claim. Thus, the Appellants have
18 not met their burden of showing the Examiner erred in finding that Ring
19 would read on all of the elements in claim 77 when a buyer in Ring executes
20 the purchase contracted for.

21 *Claim 78*

22 Claim 78 contains the subject matter of claim 77 and further adds the
23 limitation that calculation of the penalty amount takes into account a value
24 of the reward.

1 The Examiner found that Ring anticipated claim 78 (Answer 4). The
2 Examiner found that the earnest money required is less than the amount that
3 would have been required by an amount proportionate to the difference in
4 the reduction of asking price (Answer 9; also appendix to Answer).

5 The Appellants contend that, beyond the arguments they made in
6 support of claim 77, there is no calculation of earnest money based on a
7 difference between an asking price and a contract price (Reply Br. 10).

8 Ring describes the deposit as resulting from a calculation in which the
9 amount is proportionate to the contract amount (FF 12). As the Examiner
10 found, the difference between the deposit actually made and that which
11 would have been required had no price reduction occurred would similarly
12 be proportionate to the amount of the price reduction. Thus, the issue raised
13 by the Appellants is whether the calculation described by Ring takes the
14 difference between original asking price and final contract price into
15 account. The Specification does not define the phrase “take into account,”
16 but this phrase is an idiom whose customary meaning is to allow for (FF 06
17 & 07). We find that because the amount of the deposit, whose forfeiture
18 would become a penalty if the purchase was not made, is calculated from the
19 contract price, and this contract price allows for the reduction from the
20 original asking price, then the calculation of the deposit allows for the
21 reward of the discount from original asking price that ends up in the final
22 contract price. Thus, we find that the Appellants have not met their burden
23 of showing the Examiner erred.

24 *Claim 81*

1 Claim 81 contains the subject matter of claim 77 and further adds the
2 limitations (1) that the description having a degree of specificity; (2)
3 receiving a degree of certainty with which the potential buyer intends to
4 purchase the item within the particular time period; (3) determining a reward
5 offer associated with a reward based on at least one of the degree of
6 specificity, the degree of certainty, and a length of the particular time period;
7 (4) the reward offer comprises an offer for money for the potential buyer; (5)
8 receiving a confirmation signal indicating that the potential buyer purchased
9 the item within the particular time period; and (6) determining whether the
10 confirmation signal indicating that the potential buyer has purchased the
11 item within the particular time period has been received.

12 The Examiner found that Ring anticipated claim 81 (Answer 3-4).

13 The Appellants contend that Ring does not anticipate claim 81 for the
14 same reasons argued for claim 77, *supra*, and further that Ring fails to
15 describe a reward based on a degree of certainty (Appeal Br. 31-33). The
16 Examiner responds that he found that Ring describes dropping the price to
17 increase the possibility of a sale (Answer 4).

18 Apart from the arguments made in support of claim 77, which we
19 found to be insufficient to show the Examiner erred, *supra*, we further find
20 that claim 81 is more broad in its scope of a reward, since claim 81 recites a
21 reward as being an offer for money rather than money *per se*. In addition to
22 the discount that we found to be a reward described by Ring, *supra*, Ring
23 also describes the award of the contract (FF 09), which is also an example of
24 a satisfying result and thus is within the scope of the term “reward” that
25 comprises an offer for money for the buyer in terms of the reduced contract
26 price.

1 We further find that Ring's contract includes provisions as to
2 specificity of the property, certainty as to what are the contingent elements,
3 such as adequacy of title and availability of financing elements that must be
4 met before the contract will close, and length of time until closing (FF 11).
5 Since these are elements of the contract and the reward is the reduction in
6 contract price, the awarding of the contract for that price can be said to be
7 based on those elements. Accordingly, we find the Appellants have not met
8 their burden of showing the Examiner erred.

9 *Claim 82*

10 Claim 82 contains the subject matter of claims 81 and 78.

11 The Examiner found that Ring anticipated claim 82 (Answer 4). The
12 Appellants contend that claim 82 is patentable for the same reasons they
13 made for the patentability of claims 81 and 78, *supra* (Appeal Br. 34-35).
14 We found that those arguments did not allow the Appellants to meet their
15 burden of showing the Examiner erred, and we find similarly with respect to
16 claim 82.

17 The Appellants have not sustained their burden of showing that the
18 Examiner erred in rejecting claims 77, 78, 81, and 82 under 35 U.S.C. §
19 102(b) as anticipated by Ring.

20 *Claims 79, 80, and 83-88 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable*
21 *over Ring.*

22 *Claims 79 and 80*

23 Claim 79 contains the subject matter of claim 77 and further adds the
24 limitation that the step of applying the penalty comprises the steps of:

1 receiving a confirmation that the potential buyer has purchased
2 within the particular time period a similar item to the item the
3 potential buyer intended to purchase; and

4 applying a partial penalty to the financial account of the
5 potential buyer, wherein the partial penalty is less than a total
6 penalty charged when the potential buyer fails to purchase the
7 item within the particular time period.

8 The Examiner found that one of ordinary skill would have known that
9 charging only a partial penalty for a customer who actually made a purchase,
10 just not the one envisioned, would help keep customers satisfied and
11 concluded that claim 79 was obvious over Ring.

12 Claim 80 contains the subject matter of claim 77 and further adds the
13 limitation that the step of applying the penalty comprises the steps of:

14 receiving a confirmation that the potential buyer has purchased
15 within the particular time period a similar item to the item the
16 potential buyer intended to purchase; and

17 applying a partial penalty to the financial account.

18 The Examiner found that one of ordinary skill would have known that
19 charging only a partial penalty for a customer who actually made a purchase,
20 just not the one envisioned, would help keep customers satisfied and
21 concluded that claim 80 was obvious over Ring.

22 The Appellants contend that the Examiner has provided no evidence
23 of the scenario of a builder offering multiple properties, adding a partial
24 penalty or changing the property to be purchased; that the Examiner failed to
25 make findings as to the level of skill in the art; and the Examiner failed to
26 show how these findings would have suggested a partial penalty (Appeal Br.
27 57-61).

1 The Examiner made findings as to these elements and the Appellants
2 have provided no contention that would put these findings in doubt; the
3 Appellants have done no more than argue that the Examiner relied on
4 findings of the knowledge in the art rather than written evidence. We find
5 the Examiner’s findings to be well within the knowledge of one of ordinary
6 skill (FF 17-20), and are findings as to what might be predictable contract
7 provisions. In many fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious
8 techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market
9 demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends. *KSR*, 127
10 S.Ct. at 1741.

11 Further, Ring describes a partial penalty explicitly in the form of
12 damages (FF 14). As to the level of skill, Ring provides sufficient evidence
13 for this. *See Okajima v. Bourdeau*, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, 59 USPQ2d 1795,
14 1797 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of
15 skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself
16 reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’”).
17 Finally, these claims depend from claim 77, and as we found *supra*, the step
18 of applying the penalty is conditional and therefore optional when Ring’s
19 buyer performs according to the contract. Thus, we find the Appellants have
20 failed to meet their burden of showing the Examiner erred.

21 *Claims 83-85*

22 Claim 83 contains the subject matter of claim 81, but changes the
23 limitation of the potential buyer having purchased the item *within* the
24 particular time period to that of having purchased *after* the time period and
25 then applying a *partial* penalty.

1 Claim 84 contains the subject matter of claim 81 and but changes the
2 limitation of receiving a confirmation signal indicating that the potential
3 buyer purchased the item to that of the buyer having purchased a *similar*
4 item and then applying a *partial* penalty.

5 Claim 85 contains the subject matter of claim 81 and but changes the
6 limitation of receiving a confirmation signal indicating that the potential
7 buyer purchased the item within the particular time period to that of
8 receiving the signal *after* the time period that the potential buyer purchased
9 the item within the particular time period and then applying a *partial*
10 penalty.

11 The Examiner found that one of ordinary skill would have known that
12 a seller might agree to a late sale and might charge some reduced penalty for
13 the tardiness (Answer 4).

14 The Appellants contend that these claims are not obvious for the same
15 reasons they contended with respect to claims 77, 78, and 80, *supra*, and
16 further that the Examiner provided no written evidence for his findings or
17 provided a motivation to combine these findings. The Appellants also argue
18 that the Examiner overlooked the differences in the causes triggering a
19 penalty in the claims (Appeal Br. 62-74).

20 Apart from the Appellants' arguments made in support of claims 77,
21 78, and 80, which we found to be insufficient to show the Examiner erred,
22 *supra*, we further find that claims 83-85 are more broad in their scope of a
23 reward than claim 77, since these claims recite a reward offer rather than a
24 reward *per se*. In addition to the discount that we found to be a reward
25 described by Ring, *supra*, Ring also describes the award of the contract (FF

1 09), which is also an example of a satisfying result, and thus is within the
2 scope of the term “reward” that comprises a reward offer for the buyer.

3 As to the Examiner’s findings, we find, as we did with claim 81,
4 *supra*, that the contract provisions would have been predictable to one of
5 ordinary skill. Applying penalties for tardiness in either performance or
6 notice of performance, which are provided in differing permutations in these
7 claims, would have been predictable contract provisions to one of ordinary
8 skill in the real estate transaction arts (FF 16-17), and such provisions are
9 simply directed to predictable market forces.

10 Thus, we find the Appellants have not met their burden of showing
11 the Examiner erred.

12 *Claims 86-88*

13 Claim 86 contains the subject matter of claim 77 and further adds the
14 limitations of repeatedly outputting a reward offer to the potential buyer;
15 determining whether the potential buyer accepts the offer; and modifying the
16 offer if the potential buyer rejects the offer until the potential buyer accepts
17 the offer. Claim 86 also does not contain a limitation as to what the reward
18 offer comprises.

19 Claim 87 contains the subject matter of claim 86 and further adds the
20 limitation that determining that a confirmation signal is valid includes one or
21 more of the steps of: verifying a potential buyer identifier; determining
22 whether the confirmation signal was received within the particular time
23 period; and determining whether the new item purchased by the potential
24 buyer is related to the item the potential buyer intended to purchase within

1 the particular time period. Claim 88 contains the subject matter of claim 86
2 and 78.

3 The Examiner found that recursive negotiation was known to those of
4 ordinary skill to be a mechanism for resolving contract details (Answer 5).

5 The Appellants contend that these claims are not obvious for the same
6 reasons they contended with respect to claim 77, 78, and 81, *supra*, and
7 further that the Examiner provided no written evidence for his findings or
8 provided a motivation to combine these findings (Appeal Br. 48-56).

9 Apart from the Appellants' arguments made in support of claims 77,
10 78, and 81, which we found to be insufficient to show the Examiner erred,
11 *supra*, we further find that claims 86-88 are more broad in their scope of a
12 reward than claim 77, since these claims recite a reward offer for money
13 rather than a reward *per se*. In addition to the discount that we found to be a
14 reward described by Ring, *supra*, Ring also describes the award of the
15 contract (FF 09), which is also an example of a satisfying result and thus is
16 within the scope of the term "reward" that comprises a reward offer for
17 money for the buyer.

18 As to the Examiner's findings, we find, as we did with claim 81,
19 *supra*, that the contract provisions would have been predictable to one of
20 ordinary skill. Negotiating contract provisions in iterative negotiations
21 would have been predictable contract provisions to one of ordinary skill in
22 the real estate transaction arts, as almost anyone who has purchased a home
23 recognizes. Further, iterative negotiation was described by Ring (FF13).
24 Such negotiations are simply directed to predictable market forces. As to the
25 verification elements in claim 87, one of ordinary would have known that it

1 was conventional to verify that contract provisions are met for the purpose
2 of ensuring performance (FF 18). In many fields it may be that there is little
3 discussion of obvious techniques or combinations. *KSR*, 127 S.Ct. at 1741.

4 Thus, we find the Appellants have not met their burden of showing
5 the Examiner erred.

6 The Appellants have not sustained their burden of showing that the
7 Examiner erred in rejecting claims 79, 80, and 83-88 under 35 U.S.C. §
8 103(a) as unpatentable over Ring.

9 *Claims 89 and 90 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over*
10 *Abecassis and Ring.*

11 Claim 90 is directed to a system performing the subject matter of
12 claim 77 but does not have a limitation as to what the reward comprises.
13 Claim 89 is the same as claim 90 except that a penalty is charged if a
14 confirmation signal is not received within the particular time period.

15 The Examiner found that Abecassis describes a system providing an
16 escrow service, as might be used for real estate transactions, and that one of
17 ordinary skill would have known of the applicability of Abecassis' system
18 for real estate transactions. The Examiner concluded it would have been
19 obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to have applied Abecassis'
20 escrow system to the escrow needs of real estate transactions described by
21 Ring (Answer 5).

22 The Appellants contend that the combination of Abecassis and Ring
23 does not make claims 89 and 90 obvious for the same reasons argued for
24 claim 77, *supra* (Appeal Br. 42-45).

- 1 • The rejection of claims 89 and 90 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
2 unpatentable over Abecassis and Ring is sustained.

3 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
4 this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2007).

5

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AFFIRMED

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