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OF THE T.T.A.B.**

Paper No. 17
Bottorff

8/30/00

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

In re Auto Value Associates, Inc.¹

Serial No. 75/338,335

Harry B. Ray of Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. for Auto Value Associates, Inc.

Barbara Gaynor, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 104 (Sidney I. Moskowitz, Managing Attorney)

Before Cissel, Bucher and Bottorff, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Bottorff, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Applicant has filed an application seeking registration on the Principal Register of the mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA, in typed form, for goods identified in the application, as amended, as "automobile brake parts,

¹ In its reply brief, applicant asserts that its name was changed on January 1, 2000 to Aftermarket Auto Parts Alliance, Inc. However, it does not appear from the Office's automated assignment records that any name change, assignment or other transfer document has been recorded. Accordingly, the Board shall continue to refer to applicant by the name set forth in the original application papers, i.e., Auto Value Associates, Inc.

namely, disc brake pads."² The specimens submitted with the original application papers consisted of packaging for the goods, upon which the following design is depicted:

² Serial No. 75/338,335, filed August 8, 1997. Applicant has disclaimed PARTS apart from the mark as shown. The application is based on use in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. §1051(a), and June 30, 1995 is alleged as the date of first use of the mark anywhere and first use of the mark in commerce. In the application, applicant has claimed ownership of five registrations of the mark PARTS MASTER (PARTS disclaimed), in typed form, for various automotive parts and accessories. Applicant also claimed ownership of Registration No. 2,044,097, issued March 11, 1997, of the typed mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA (PARTS disclaimed), the same mark involved in the present application, for "spark plug wire and cable." Additionally, in its request for reconsideration in this case, applicant asserted ownership of Registration No. 2,201,241, issued November 3, 1998, of the same PARTS MASTER ULTRA (PARTS disclaimed) mark for "automobile batteries." Finally, the Board notes that Registration No. 2,308,596 was issued to applicant on January 18, 2000. The mark depicted in that registration is the composite design and word mark appearing on the original specimens of record in this case, as depicted in the main text of this opinion at page 2. Color is not claimed as a feature of this registered mark, and applicant has disclaimed PARTS and THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS apart from the mark as shown. The goods identified in the registration are "spark plug wire and cable."

On the specimens, the pennant or banner background element of the design is yellow with red borders, and the three parallel rectangles are blue with white borders. The words PARTS MASTER® and THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS are in white on the blue background of the rectangles, and the triangle to the left of the word PARTS is in yellow. The word ULTRA is in red.

The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Trademark Rule 2.51(a)(1), 37 C.F.R. §2.51(a)(1), on the ground that the drawing of the mark was not a substantially exact representation of the mark used on the goods, as evidenced by the specimens. In response, applicant argued that its original specimens of use are sufficient under Trademark Rule 2.51(a)(1), but also eventually submitted, in the alternative, two different brochures as substitute specimens pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.59(a). The Trademark Examining Attorney, however, maintained her rejection of the original specimens, and also rejected each of applicant's proffered substitute specimens on the ground that they are merely advertising brochures which do not suffice, under Trademark Rule 2.56,

as acceptable specimens of trademark use of the mark on the identified goods.³

When the refusal to register was made final, applicant filed this appeal. Applicant and the Trademark Examining Attorney have filed main briefs, and applicant has filed a reply brief. No oral hearing was requested. We affirm the refusal to register.

We turn first to the Trademark Examining Attorney's rejection of the original specimens. In support thereof, she contends that those specimens do not evidence use of PARTS MASTER ULTRA as a single, unitary mark as depicted on applicant's drawing. Rather, she argues, these specimens show use of two separate marks, i.e., PARTS MASTER, and ULTRA. She argues that the designations PARTS MASTER and ULTRA, as they appear on the specimens, would be not be perceived as a single, unitary mark because they are physically separated by space and by the wording THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS, and because they appear on the

³ Initially, the Trademark Examining Attorney also rejected the substitute specimens because they were not supported by a declaration establishing that they were in use in commerce as of the application filing date. Applicant filed such a declaration along with its main appeal brief, and the Board remanded the application to the Trademark Examining Attorney for consideration thereof. The Trademark Examining Attorney then accepted the declaration, but maintained her rejection of the substitute specimens on the ground that they are merely advertising materials.

specimens in two different type styles, in two different colors, and in two different sizes. Citing *In re Jordan Industries, Inc.*, 210 USPQ 158 (TTAB 1980) and *In re Audi NSU Auto Union AG*, 197 USPQ 649 (TTAB 1977), the Trademark Examining Attorney contends that applicant is impermissibly attempting to register two different marks in a single application, i.e., a house mark, PARTS MASTER, and a product mark, ULTRA.

Applicant, by contrast, argues that its original specimens evidence use of PARTS MASTER ULTRA as a unitary composite mark. Applicant notes that both PARTS MASTER and ULTRA appear within the borders of the overall banner design, and that they are much larger and more prominent than the other wording appearing therein, i.e., THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS. Applicant contends that because PARTS MASTER and ULTRA are so much larger than that other wording, and because they are symmetrically placed above and below that other wording, the three words would be perceived together as the components of a single, unitary mark, i.e., PARTS MASTER ULTRA. Finally, applicant argues that it never uses the term ULTRA alone, but rather always in conjunction with PARTS MASTER, and accordingly that it is seeking to register one mark, not two.

We have carefully considered applicant's arguments, but we agree with the Trademark Examining Attorney's contention that PARTS MASTER and ULTRA, as they appear on these specimens, do not comprise a single, unitary mark, but rather would be perceived as two separate marks. First, we note that when determining whether the composite sought to be registered projects a single, unitary commercial impression, "[e]verything depends on the specimens." *In re Audi NSU Auto Union AG, supra*, 197 USPQ at 650. Therefore, we accord no weight to applicant's assertion that it never uses ULTRA alone, but always in conjunction with PARTS MASTER.⁴ The issue is whether the specimens of record establish use of PARTS MASTER ULTRA as a unitary mark.

This is not a case in which the two components at issue appear immediately and contiguously above and below each other within the same background field. *Compare, e.g., New England Fish Company v. The Herwin Company*, 179 USPQ 743 (TTAB 1973) (specimens depicted BLUE MOUNTAIN (in one typestyle) positioned directly above KITTY O'S (in a very different typestyle), both designations within a blue

⁴ Additionally, we note that even if applicant might never use ULTRA alone as a mark, it is clear from the record that it uses PARTS MASTER alone as a house mark. See, e.g., applicant's "Exhibit B" substitute specimen, *infra*, and applicant's various registrations of the mark PARTS MASTER, *supra* at footnote 2.

rectangular design; mark held to be unitary). Rather, in this case, the word ULTRA is separated from the words PARTS MASTER by the intervening words THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS. Moreover, although ULTRA and PARTS MASTER are both within the borders of the overall yellow banner design element, ULTRA (in red lettering) is conspicuously excluded from the large blue rectangle (made up of three parallel blue rectangles) within which the words PARTS MASTER and THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS appear in white lettering.

Indeed, if any two of the components of the design create a single, unitary commercial impression, it is not the components PARTS MASTER and ULTRA, but rather the components PARTS MASTER and THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS, both of which appear in white lettering within the larger composite blue rectangle. The manner in which THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS is displayed in the design in conjunction with PARTS MASTER makes it unlikely that purchasers would combine PARTS MASTER with ULTRA into a single, unitary mark. See *In re Jordan Industries, Inc.*, *supra* (as presented on specimens, JIF-LOK more likely to be perceived as part of the phrase JIF-LOK MIRACLE FASTENER than as part of a mark sought to be registered, i.e., JORDAN JIF-LOK; held, JORDAN JIF-LOK two marks, not a unitary mark).

Normally, the mere fact that PARTS MASTER and ULTRA appear on the specimens in different type styles, in different colors, and in different sizes would not necessarily preclude a finding that the two designations together comprise a single, unitary mark. See *New England Fish Company, supra*. In this case, however, those basic distinctions between PARTS MASTER and ULTRA, when combined with the presence of the intervening words THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS and the fact that ULTRA, alone among all of the words appearing in the mark, is not included within the blue rectangle, lead us to conclude that ULTRA and PARTS MASTER would be perceived as two separate marks, rather than as components of a single unitary mark.

In addition to its arguments based on the specimens themselves, applicant also argues, essentially, that the Trademark Examining Attorney should be estopped to reject applicant's original specimens in this case. More specifically, applicant contends that it owns two prior registrations of the typed form mark at issue here, PARTS MASTER ULTRA, for goods which are closely related to the goods identified in the present application;⁵ that the

⁵ See *supra* at footnote 2. The first such registration is Registration No. 2,044,097, issued March 11, 1997, of the typed form mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA (PARTS disclaimed) for "spark plug wire and cable." Applicant asserts in its briefs that the goods identified in the present application, "automobile brake parts,

specimens submitted by applicant with each of the applications which led to those registrations were essentially identical to the original specimens applicant submitted with the present application, insofar as the manner in which the mark was displayed; that the Office, acting through two different Trademark Examining Attorneys, accepted those specimens in the other two applications as acceptable evidence of applicant's use of the mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA; that, notwithstanding the general rule that a Trademark Examining Attorney is not bound by the decisions of prior Trademark Examining Attorneys in other applications, the Trademark Examining Attorney's rejection of the essentially identical original specimens in the present case constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the validity of applicant's prior registrations which, pursuant to (or by extension of) Trademark Rule 2.106(b)(2)(ii), should only be allowed to be raised by way of a petition to cancel those prior registrations; and that, under the doctrine set forth in *Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.*, 105 S.Ct. 658, 224 USPQ 327

namely, disc brake pads," originally were included in the application which matured into this registration but were deleted by amendment during prosecution. The second registration cited by applicant is Registration No. 2,201,241, issued November 3, 1998, of the typed form mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA (PARTS disclaimed) for "automobile batteries."

(1985) and *In re The American Sail Training Association*, 230 USPQ 879 (TTAB 1986), applicant's ownership of those registrations, and the Office's acceptance of applicant's specimens in those cases, precludes the Office from rejecting the essentially identical specimens submitted by applicant in this case.

Applicant's arguments are without legal basis or merit. It is well-settled that, in an ex parte proceeding involving a particular application, neither the Trademark Examining Attorney nor the Board is bound by the decisions of other Trademark Examining Attorneys made in connection with other applications. This is so even where, as in the present case, the applicant, the facts, and the legal issues involved in the application on appeal are identical to those presented in the prior application(s). For example, the case of *In re Medical Disposables Co.*, 25 USPQ2d 1802 (TTAB 1992) involved an application to register MEDICAL DISPOSABLES and design, in which applicant sought to enter separate disclaimers of MEDICAL and DISPOSABLES. The Board affirmed the Trademark Examining Attorney's requirement that a single disclaimer of MEDICAL DISPOSABLES be entered, finding that the phrase was unitary and that the words accordingly could not be disclaimed separately. The applicant in that case argued that because it owned a

prior Principal Register registration of the word mark MEDICAL DISPOSABLES in which separate disclaimers had been permitted by a different Trademark Examining Attorney, it was entitled to separately disclaim those words in its later application. The Board rejected that argument. Similarly in the present case, the acceptance by the prior Trademark Examining Attorneys of applicant's specimens as evidence of applicant's use of the typed mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA is not binding on the Board in this case, and does not excuse or preclude the Board from reaching its own decision on the issue presented.

Applicant's reliance on Trademark Rule 2.106(b)(2)(ii) is without legal basis. That rule, and its counterpart in cancellation proceedings, Trademark Rule 2.114(b)(2)(ii), are essentially compulsory counterclaim rules which apply only to inter partes litigation proceedings at the Board (e.g., opposition and cancellation proceedings).⁶ On their faces, those rules are inapplicable to ex parte proceedings such as this one. Moreover, and contrary to applicant's

⁶ Trademark Rule 2.106(b)(2)(ii) provides: "An attack on the validity of a registration pleaded by an opposer will not be heard unless a counterclaim or separate petition is filed to seek the cancellation of such registration." Likewise, Trademark Rule 2.114(b)(2)(ii) provides: "An attack on the validity of a registration pleaded by a petitioner for cancellation will not be heard unless a counterclaim or separate petition is filed to seek the cancellation of such registration."

contention, those rules cannot be extended to the ex parte examination and appeal process, inasmuch as neither the statute nor any other of the Trademark Rules provides for any mechanism by which the Trademark Examining Attorney might petition to cancel an applicant's prior registration.

Applicant's reliance on *Park 'N Fly* and *In re American Sail Training Association* is also fundamentally misplaced, because applicant's prior registrations are not incontestable, and because the goods identified in the present application are not the same as or included among the goods identified in applicant's prior registrations of the mark in question. Contrary to applicant's wholly unsupported contentions, these distinguishing factors are not inconsequential or immaterial. Rather, the Board and its primary reviewing court have repeatedly held that two essential prerequisites to the applicability of the doctrine established in *Park 'N Fly* and *In re American Sail Training Association* are that the goods or services identified in the later application must be identical to or encompassed within the goods or services identified in the prior registration, and that the prior registration must be incontestable. See, e.g., *In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith Inc.*, 828 F.2d 1567, 4 USPQ2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1987); *In re Loew's Theatres, Inc.*, 769 F.2d 764, 226

USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Sunmarks Inc.*, 32 USPQ2d 1470 (TTAB 1994); and *In re American Sail Training Association, supra*. Neither of those prerequisites has been satisfied in this case.

In summary, it is of no avail to applicant in this case that, in the course of issuing two other registrations to applicant of the typed mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA for goods which are not the same as goods identified in the present application, the Office apparently accepted specimens which were essentially identical to the original specimens rejected by the Trademark Examining Attorney in the present application. The decisions and actions of the prior Trademark Examining Attorneys in issuing applicant's prior registrations have no bearing on our decision in this case as to whether the present Trademark Examining Attorney's rejection of applicant's specimens should be affirmed or reversed. See *In re Sunmarks Inc., supra*, and *In re Medical Disposables Co., supra*. For the reasons stated earlier in this opinion, we find that applicant's original specimens are unacceptable and insufficient as evidence of applicant's use in commerce of the mark sought to be registered, PARTS MASTER ULTRA.

We turn next to the issue of whether applicant's proffered substitute specimens are acceptable as specimens

of use of the mark sought to be registered. The first substitute specimen, submitted by applicant as "Exhibit A," is an 8½ x 11 brochure or flyer, reproduced below:⁷

⁷ The brochure is printed in color. Applicant apparently is relying on the text toward the top which reads "FOR TOP PERFORMANCE AND NOISE-FREE BRAKING, USE ONLY PARTS MASTER® ULTRA SEMI-METALLIC DISC BRAKE PADS." Those words are printed in red ink, with the exception of the words PARTS MASTER, which are printed in blue. The yellow triangle design element to the left of the word PARTS does not reproduce satisfactorily, but it is the same design element that is visible to the left of the word PARTS in the "banner" logo in the top left corner of the brochure.

Applicant has presented no actual evidence of how this brochure is used in connection with the goods, but relies instead merely on the assertions and arguments of its counsel. In applicant's request for reconsideration, with which the brochure was originally submitted, applicant's counsel stated that "[o]n occasion, these specimens are shipped with the brake part products by the manufacturer to the distributor and then reshipped by the distributor to the auto parts stores." (Request for reconsideration, at page 1.) In applicant's appeal brief, applicant's counsel states that these brochures "are shipped with the brake part products by the manufacturer to the distributor and then reshipped by the distributor to the auto parts stores. These materials are packaged with the goods and would be visible to a potential customer examining the goods." (Appeal Brief at 3.) In applicant's reply brief, applicant's counsel states: "[a]s shown by the record, these specimens were directly associated with the goods offered for sale. They were included in the packaging."

Applicant also argues in its reply brief that the brochure satisfies the three criteria set out in TMEP section 905.06, as established in the case of *Lands' End, Inc. v. Manbeck*, 797 F.Supp. 51, 24 USPQ2d 1314 (E.D.Va. 1992), by which a catalog or other advertising might

constitute a display associated with the goods. That is, applicant argues, the specimen includes a prominent depiction of the mark in close proximity to a photograph of the goods, and it includes

sufficient information to order the goods, because it shows the name of the manufacturer, Morse Automotive Corporation. Morse Automotive Corporation manufactures the goods in accordance with the product specifications established by the Applicant. The Applicant strictly controls the nature and quality of the goods identified by the mark. Any warehouse distributor or automotive parts store receiving this display would know how to order the goods, merely by seeing the name of the manufacturer as they are well acquainted with each vendor the Applicant permits to manufacture goods identified by its marks.

(Reply brief at 3.)

Finally, applicant argues that the brochure is acceptable as a specimen because it is a package insert which is part of the goods themselves, within the meaning of TMEP section 905.07. "In this case, the specimens contained important information regarding various features of the goods and should not be considered as merely advertising." (Reply brief at 4.)

Taking applicant's last argument first, we find that the "Exhibit A" brochure cannot be deemed to be "part of

the goods," and that the appearance of the mark thereon⁸ accordingly does not constitute use of the mark "on the goods." The "inserts as specimens" referred to in the heading of TMEP section 905.07 are of the type involved in *In re Ultraflight Inc.*, 221 USPQ 903 (TTAB 1984), in which the goods (powered hang-glider sold in kit form), as packaged by the applicant, included a printed manual which contained the instructions for assembling the kit. The Board held that the manual was an integral part of the goods themselves, and that use of the mark on the manual therefore constituted use of the mark on the goods themselves. In the present case, by contrast, applicant's brochure is not a component of the goods, nor is it needed in order to assemble, install or operate the goods. Rather, the brochure merely touts the advantageous features of the goods, and serves no identifiable purpose except that of advertising and promoting the goods. See *In re Drilco Industrial Inc.*, 15 USPQ2d 1671 (TTAB 1990).

Next, we find no basis in the record for concluding that the "Exhibit A" brochure is a "display" associated with the goods. As the Board explained in *In re Bright of America, Inc.*, 205 USPQ 63 (TTAB 1979):

⁸ We are assuming, *arguendo*, that the brochure in fact evidences use of the unitary mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA.

A display associated with the goods within the scope of Section 45, as interpreted by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and other tribunals, comprises essentially point-of-sale material such as banners, shelf-talkers, window displays, menus, or similar devices which are designed to catch the attention of purchasers and prospective purchasers as an inducement to consummate a sale and which prominently display the mark in question and associate it or relate it to the goods in such a way that an association of the two is inevitable even though the goods may not be placed in close proximity to the display or, in fact, even though the goods may not physically exist at the time a purchaser views the display.

205 USPQ at 65. With respect to brochures of the type involved in this case, the TMEP correctly states:

Folders and brochures describing goods and their characteristics or serving as advertising literature are not per se "displays." *In re Schiapparelli Searle*, 26 USPQ2d 1520 (TTAB 1993); *In re Drilco Industrial Inc.*, 15 USPQ2d 1671 (TTAB 1990). In order to rely on such materials as specimens, an applicant must submit evidence of point-of-sale presentation. See *In re Ancha Electronics Inc.*, 1 USPQ2d 1318 (TTAB 1986); *In re Columbia Chase Corp.*, 215 USPQ 478 (TTAB 1982).

TMEP section 905.06.

In the present case, there is no declaration or other evidence in the record from which we might conclude that the brochure is displayed at the point of sale. Compare,

e.g., In re Ancha Electronics Inc., supra. Even the non-evidentiary statements made by applicant's counsel fail to establish that the brochures are used as point-of-sale display materials. He states that the brochures are shipped with the goods by the manufacturer to the distributor and then reshipped by the distributor to the auto parts retailers. However, by the time the distributor sees the brochure shipped with the goods, it presumably has already purchased the goods. Likewise, the retailer will already have purchased the goods from the distributor by the time it sees the brochure.

Further, there is no evidence that the brochures are displayed by the retailers to the ultimate consumers in such a manner as to induce the consummation of a sale. Counsel states that the brochures are "packaged with the goods and would be visible to a potential customer examining the goods," and that they "were directly associated with the goods offered for sale. They were included in the packaging." These assertions, even if they had been properly attested to by persons with first-hand knowledge, are far too indefinite to serve as a basis for finding that the brochures are displayed to the ultimate consumers at the point of sale. "Material which is no more than advertising does not necessarily cease to be

advertising because it is placed inside a package." TMEP section 905.07. Although an advertising brochure such as applicant's, inserted into the packaging for the goods, might have been acceptable evidence of use under the Act of 1905, it is not acceptable under the Lanham Act of 1946. See *In re Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co.*, 173 USPQ 8, 10 (CCPA 1972)(distinguishing a decision under the 1905 Act in which a leaflet inserted within a carton was deemed to be a proper trademark use).

Finally, we reject applicant's contention that its brochure satisfies the three criteria for categorization as a "catalog or other display" set out by TMEP section 905.06 and in *Lands' End, Inc. v. Manbeck, supra*. What the Board said in *In re Schiapparelli Searle, supra*, a case much like the present one involving brochures which were asserted by the applicant to be "displays" within the meaning of *Lands' End v. Manbeck*, applies equally to the present case:

In that case [*Lands' End v. Manbeck*], the court held that a mail-order retailer's use of a mark in a catalog together with a picture of the goods, words describing the goods, specifications and options from which a customer might choose, as well as mail-order forms and telephone numbers for phone orders were sufficient use to satisfy the trademark statute. In *Lands' End*, goods were offered and sales were completed directly from the catalog. No sales are made from applicant's brochures, which bear little

resemblance to the mail-order catalog with order forms in *Lands' End*.

In re Schiapparelli Searle, supra, 26 USPQ2d at 1522.

Applicant's argument that its brochure qualifies as a *Lands' End*-type display because the name of the manufacturer of the goods is included thereon is not persuasive. By that reasoning, just about any advertising flyer which included the name of the advertiser or manufacturer would qualify as a display and hence as an acceptable specimen of trademark use. That clearly is not the law under *Lands' End*.

In summary, we have carefully considered applicant's arguments in support of its contention that its "Exhibit A" substitute specimen is an acceptable specimen of trademark use, but we are not persuaded. The brochure is merely an advertisement, and as such it is not evidence of use of the trademark on the goods identified in the application.

We turn finally to applicant's "Exhibit B" substitute specimen, another 8½ x 11 color brochure which is reproduced below:

This brochure is unacceptable as a "display" specimen for all of the same reasons discussed above with respect to the "Exhibit A" brochure. It is merely an advertising brochure. Applicant, however, appears to be contending that it is not the brochure, per se, that is being submitted as a specimen, i.e., as a display associated with the goods. Rather, the specimen is said to be the photograph, in the center panel of the brochure, of applicant's product container which allegedly bears the mark.

We note that the product container depicted in the photograph is the same product container which applicant submitted as its original specimen, upon which the composite design reproduced *supra* at page 2 appears. For the reasons discussed at length earlier in this opinion, the Board has already found that this product container, bearing that design, is unacceptable as evidence of trademark use of the typed mark PARTS MASTER ULTRA. Applicant argues that the photograph on the brochure is so small that one cannot readily read the small-print words THE ULTIMATE REPLACEMENT PARTS which appear between PARTS MASTER and ULTRA, such that the only words of the composite which are legible and readily ascertainable in the photograph are the larger-type words PARTS MASTER ULTRA. We are not persuaded. Having found that the actual product container is not acceptable as a specimen, we also find that a photograph of that same container, even if it is small, illegible or otherwise poorly reproduced, is not an acceptable specimen either.

To summarize, we find that neither applicant's original specimens nor either of its two substitute specimens is acceptable evidence of trademark use of the

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mark sought to be registered, i.e., PARTS MASTER ULTRA.

Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.

R. F. Cissel

D. E. Bucher

C. M. Bottorff

Administrative Trademark Judges
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board